The dynamic turn
Polemics aside, what specific features of legal reasoning might set it apart from logical reasoning in general? Generally speaking, these will reflect its task of delivering rationality under real-time constraints. Here are some positive prejudices to this effect from an outsider (often a good source of biased positive views):
• the crucial importance of good procedure and timing
• the role of different parties, not just one lonely Thinker
• inevitably limited resources for the reasoning process
• the aim for, not absolute, but reasonable certainty
Law has been so succesful in delivering 'real-time rationality' under these constraints that some philosophers see it as one main pillar of our western culture, which should not be 'reduced' to the other (being mathematics). But in recent years, logicians, too, are becoming increasingly interested in general cognitive mechanisms of reasoning and information flow, partly under the influence of computer science and AI. In this movement essential aspects are again: resources (notably, computational ones of time and effort), preferences (of both single and multiple agents), procedure and timing. This dynamic turn has noticeable influences on logical theory and practice, which makes traditional comparisons with legal reasoning less conclusive. (Note 1.)
Logical dynamics
Traditionally, logic is taken to be about implications between static propositions that are true or false about the world. The emphasis is then on 'truth conditions' for these propositions, and on sound and complete proof rules that manipulate these.
To-day's 'dynamic turn' shifts the perspective towards general processes changing information states about the world -of which reasoning is an important example, iii but not the only one. When using language to communicate, people modify their own and other people's information, often in subtle ways. In a modern slogan:
Statements are actions -and therefore natural language is not a description language, but a kind of programming language for cognition.
What we need to investigate then are the 'update conditions' for statements.
Likewise, reasoning is a stepwise activity, whose success involves judicious use of timing and resources. Note that indeed the very terms "statement", and "reasoning"
are ambiguous between 'activities' and the 'products' of those activities! Here is a warm-up example for the rest of this paper, demonstrating the new way of thinking. To a first approximation, one person's information state is the set of all relevant possibilities that she entertains;
updates are actions that change this information set.
Propositional inference as an update process
Consider two atomic propositions A, B. Their true/false combinations give 4
candidates for the real state of affairs. Information about the latter now comes in via utterances triggering updates, restricting this set. In the limit, only one option remains, and we know the real facts. Here is a video-strip illustrating successive information states and updates associated with the valid propositional inference from two premises A∨B and ¬A to the conclusion B :
AB, A-B, A∨B AB, A-B, ¬A -AB B -AB -AB, -A-B ⇒ -AB ⇒ ⇒
The two premise updates add information. We can even measure their precise strength, via the numbers of possibilities removed: the second is more informative than the first. By contrast, the conclusion is a fixed point: updating with it adds no further information, the state remains the same. This kind of update mechanism explains the solution process in simple logic puzzles, or games like 'Master Mind'.
Of course, there is much more to this than can be discussed here. (Note 2.) iv The preceding example is also misleading, however, in that most realistic communicative settings games involve updating of many-agent information states.
For instance, when a question is asked and an answer is given, two agents learn much more than a simple factual update about the content of the question. Under normal circumstances, the questioner conveys that he does not know the answer, and that he expects the answerer to know. The answerer achieves 'common knowledge' of the answer, which means that both parties now know that they both know the answer, and that the other knows this, etcetera. Such 'logical overtones'
matter. Information about other agents' knowledge or ignorance can be crucial to further action. Also, 'who knew what when' is crucial to establishing innocence or guilt. Humans are remarkably good at keeping track of such subtleties. Compare the case where everyone knows that your partner is unfaithful. This is a nuisance, but one you can live down. But if the bad situation is common knowledge, it may be time to draw your gun, restore your injured honour (and get a good lawyer…).
Updating information states for many agents is a subtle process, that we will not pursue here. (Note 3.) (Note 4.) Instead, we now turn to a many-agent model with useful concrete intuitions that will be the focus for the rest of this paper.
Games as a model for many-agent logical dynamics
A desire to improve one's skills in winning arguments and debates is a motivation for many students of logic (whether well-founded or not…), and it has indeed been a source of inspiration for logic since Antiquity. There even seems to be a plausible intuition of a 'valid inference' as a guaranteed winning strategy in debate. Even so, games have never been a major recognized paradigm for inference in logic, such as 'semantic validity' or 'provability'. But these days, this minor current is turning into a full-fledged research program using concrete games as a procedural model for a variety of logical tasks: semantic evaluation, model construction, proof, Here is the game of perfect information for the logical formula ∀x ∃y Rxy (say, the assertion that "everyone has an enemy") in this situation -pictured as a tree of possible moves, with the scheduling read from top to bottom: The proof of this is not hard ( a simple induction on formulas), but it goes one step beyond the intentions of this paper. But even so, we see some important aspects of the dynamics of two interacting logical agents, which do not arise on standard semantic accounts of truth at all. There is 'necessary effort' and 'mutual power':
(1) Fairness guarantees a win with optimal patterns of behaviour. It is not a panacea for lazy people. Verifier might play stupidly, and lose the game.
Logic is about what you can win, not what you cannot help winning.
(2) Joint powers. Even if one player has a winning strategy, outcomes may still depend on the other, who might decide e.g., where to make his final stand! (Think of the losing party at least chosing the final battlefield with honor.)
In general, then, both parties are involved in determining the final result.
Both points are important to applications of the model. In particular, it is a typical game-theoretic thought that all players are stakeholders in the final outcome.
In addition to these general points, there are also interesting technical aspects to the above connection. In particular, logical laws now acquire game-theoretic import! only by stipulation of some kind of limit to repetitions (as happens in chess). But when we move to a higher level, and consider macro-games like 'language use' (the 'operating system' of cognition), or indeed 'law' (the operating system of justice), infinite patterns and strategies become essential.
Points of relevance to legal reasoning
The preceding analysis shows that one meaningful type of legal episode, two-party disputes about facts, can be modelled as games with precise rules and winning conventions. Different roles are necessary here, players are both stakeholders (antagonistic in our particular example, but cooperative in others), and the truth of the matter is reflected in their available strategies. These strategies correspond to their rational behaviours, which they might display in court when interacting with the other party. an existential formula ∃x A(x) has to be made true, Builder must introduce a new object that can serve as a witness, while, if it is false, Critic only has to issue challenges to the effect that no existing object satisfies A . Also, Builder has no special interest in meeting every requirement (we are not talking about construction of physical buildings with possible legal action afterwards), but Critic does.
For a concrete example, the reader may want to think about Builder's moves and
Critic's challenges in a police station where people ponder the case of
The Gang of Four Somewhat unorthodox (but let us hope, admissible) detective work has yielded the following facts about the power structure in a certain gang with four members: ix
• some member either commands or is commanded by everyone else • if you are commanded by someone, you do not command anyone
Can there be gangs satisfying this description? Builder must construct a situation that do (pictures are a good means of displaying these), while Critic is a colleague trying to take this construction apart. Indeed, introducing objects that satisfy these two assertions, and that can stand up to the obvious challenges corresponding to the quantifiers "everyone else" and "you", "someone", can be done in two ways:
These two patterns correspond to the two different winning strategies which Builder in fact possesses. Notice that we are interested in both structures here, but a lawyer trying to show that the assertions are consistent would only need one.
Conversely, if a lawyer argued that this description is inconsistent -so her client could not have belonged to any such organisation -just one picture would do.
But now, a third report comes in (this is really a kind of logic police force):
• everyone takes orders from exactly one person.
This time Critic has a winning strategy, being in essence a formal proof that the three assertions together form a contradiction. There are indeed various strategies for this purpose, depending how one 'pinpoints' the contradiction.
Strategies, models and proofs
The main theoretical result about construction games is this Proposition Builder has a winning strategy in the construction game if and only if the initial set of assertions is consistent.
A more detailed analysis of the proof reveals that, as with evaluation games, x Each construction game is determined:
either Builder or Critic has a winning strategy.
The reason is not as simple as for evaluation games, since construction games can have infinite branches, corresponding to the construction of infinite models that satisfy the given assertions. This is needed to take care of predicate-logical validity in its entirety, although many practical applications will lead to finite game trees.
(Infinitely large criminal organisations seem rare, unless one thinks of Crime as one party in a never-ending game against Justice.) More concretely, there is again a lot of interesting fine-structure to the interactions between players in a construction game. In particular, different strategies carry important information:
Builder's winning srategies (if any) are the different models,
Critic's winning strategies (if any) are inconsistency proofs.
Also, despite this antagonistic description, the very asymmetry of players' moves shows that players do not necessarily have conflicting interests. We can view Critic just as well as someone who helps Builder schedule his tasks in a way which ensures solidity of the construction -and heartily rejoices in her winning strategy.
It is often quite convenient to delegate one's coordinating tasks to other parties.
A final logical point of interest is this. Generally speaking, the model evaluation task and the model construction task are of different complexity (in terms of the order of magnitude of the time steps required):
Construction games have higher computational complexity than evaluation games. Given a finite model, the evaluation games take a polynomial number p(n) of time steps (where n measures the length of the input assertions). Construction games may take forever -and even if they do terminate, they may take any (exponential) amount of time f(n) .
Thus, checking for consistency is more complex than checking for truth. A related logical point is this. Lying is a more sophisticated skill than telling the truth -and typically, it comes many years later in a child's cognitive development. A bit more generally, one can start the dialogue game with a situation where Proponent makes a claim (the conclusion), while Opponent has already granted some assertions (the premises) which proponent can exploit in further play.
But the main point we wish to stress in this section is one which comes out only in the details of such argumentation games. This concludes our discussion of logic games and their import to legal reasoning.
But this picture would be seriously incomplete without at least mention of some further themes that arise in game theory. These add more realism to the game perspective on cognitive activities: of which we will consider three main aspects.
Preferences, equilibrium, and fair outcomes
One crucial aspect of games has remained implicit so far. Like deontic reasoning, games refer essentially to players' preferences between different outcomes. With just winning and losing, we have a degenerate case of this: presumably, players prefer situations where they win over those where they lose. But in general, there may be much more finer-grained preferences between outcomes, either in the form of numerical valuations, or in the form of comparative preferences between them.
Players will seek maximal gain and minimal loss in these terms, and choose their strategies accordingly. This preference pattern is the basis for the fundamental game-theoretic notion of Nash Equilibrium, an acceptable pattern of behaviour for all participants, which can be considered 'stable' and justified. More technically, A Nash equilibrium profile is a choice of strategy for each player such that the resulting outcome cannot be improved by anyone switching his strategy (while the others keep theirs fixed).
In our determined logic games, Nash outcomes consist of a winning strategy for one player, and any strategy for the other. Of course, other players may still have reasons for choosing their strategies. If they prefer some sites for defeat to others, the equilibrium will be more subtle. Equilibria are the game-theorist's favourite tool for explaining stable rationally justified behaviour. A legal counterpart to the notion of fair value of a game might be an assessment of the parties' chances, and their preferences between various outcomes -while equilibrium pay-offs would correspond to some kind of imposed setllement.
Conversely, negotiated settlement is a juridical concept that might find further applications in game theory, or even logic when time constraints become important.
Games with imperfect information
The dynamics of playing games is rooted in what may be called 'future ignorance'.
We do not know precisely which move our opponent is going to make, and therefore, our strategy must be prepared for eventualities. In such games of imperfect information, the notion of a strategy (suitably adapted to cope with my current uncertainties) still makes sense -but the situation does get more complicated. In particular these games may be non-determined: neither player has a winning strategy. Outcomes will then depend on cleverness plus chance.
Here is a concrete example of such a game, derived from a recently proposed variation on evaluation games. Consider the earlier game of Section 5 : ∀x ∃y Rxy. unless we wish to compensate some legal actors for their stupidity -the way we sometimes take pity on unworthy opponents in a game.) If legal games have precise boundaries on the 'imperfect information' which they tolerate, this might by itself be an interesting defining feature setting them apart from games in general.
In any case, as in the preceding section, even non-determined games of imperfect information can have a value, representing what players can reasonably hope to achieve if the game is played many times. So, even in this game-theoretic scenario, there is a radical option of computing the merits of the case beforehand, and then pay/punish both parties accordingly....
Repeated games
One noteworthy feature of our logic games which we have not emphasized so far, is their 'one-shot character'. We cannot play all possible runs, which gives the actual sequence of events its drama. Say, Verifier won one run of evaluation game.
xvi Does this prove the assertion was true? No, as we have not tested whether she had a winning strategy, reacting succesfully to every play by Falsifier. So, did she win by accident or for deeper reasons? Here is where Falsifier has an interesting role to play. It is his interest to offer the best possible counter-play, in order to maximize his chances of winning -but in doing so, he also offers the best possible guarantee that Verifier really has a winning strategy! This one-shot character seems characteristic of law-suits, or soccer matches, and other types of 'decisive event'.
Nevertheless, one must realize that it does not give complete certainty. (Note 8.)
In game theory, repeated games are essential for achieving fairness and strategic equilibrium... Repeated games reveal more of players' strategies, and they give players a fair chance for changing some of the actions they took (perhaps in some randomized fashion). Thus, players will get their fair value in the long run. Of course, this would take too much time for realistic decision making -even when the separate games themselves are short. In legal procedure, some sort of repetitions are allowed (appeals), but they do not seem to have the same spirit.
Again, the better way of dealing with this need for fairness need would be by proper adjudication. Nevertheless, repeated litigation can be surprising in its own right. Instead of proper analysis, here is an old anecdote from the logic textbooks.
The sophist Corax had taught a pupil Euathlos: the fee would be the first money his student made in winning a law-suit. But Euathlos never entered court. So, Corax brought a case against him, arguing:
"Either I win, and you have to pay me (by the verdict), or I lose, and you also have to pay, by our contract."
But the obviously well-taught Euathlos produced a 'counter-dilemma':
"Either I lose (and I need not pay, by our contract), or I win, and need not pay because of the verdict."
The logical point of the anecdote is just the clever use of dilemma and counterdilemma in arguing for one's position. As for the legal point, a lawyer once told me this case should be easy to solve. The student wins the first case, since he had not promised his teacher to engage in lawsuits (there is no breach of faith). But then, the teacher must start a second lawsuit to collect his fee, and he will win that. (Note 9.) Having two lawsuits never came up in logical discussion of this puzzle! 
More precisely, construction games may be represented by the well-known logical technique of semantic tableaus, viewed this time as 'dynamic objects'.
This section only scratches the surface of a complex interaction between game theory and logic. There are many further topics of investigation here. Preferences in games also suggest deontic dynamics. One might make preferences themselves an issue for gaming, providing mechanisms for changing them.
In computer science, one has intermediate cases, where a game would be played a sufficient number of times (i.e., a sufficient number of branches of the full game tree is traversed) to make it highly plausible that Verifier has a winning strategy.
The most famous algorithm for achieving optimal performance in one-shot situations comes from a judicial setting, however, viz. Cake Cutting. This seems to derive from old Germanic procedures in dividing the loot of a raid. One party divides, the other gets the first choice -as in still visible in the Dutch expression "kiezen of delen" ("do you wish to choose, or divide up?").
In Amsterdam, Ron Allen gave a more substantial legal analysis, reproduced here from a private communication: "The contract entered into explicitly calls for the fee to "be the first money his student made in winning a law-suit." The suit does not xx call for a fee if his student wins a suit; it calls for a fee if he makes money winning a suit. When the teacher sues the student, whether the student "wins" or "loses", the student will not make money; therefore, no payment would be due under the contractual provision. Since no payment would be due under the contractual provision no matter how the lawsuit against the student comes out, obviously the lawsuit has no basis and will be dismissed. This result is unfair only if the student somehow misled the teacher. For example, perhaps the student was only interested in a learning about the law, but never intended to practice it. In order to get a free legal education, however, perhaps he feigned an interest in practice, inculcating the belief in the teacher that the student intended to practice, thus inducing the teacher to enter into this contract. Well, the law handles this as well. It is called "fraud in the inducement." If the teacher can prove that there was such fraud, he can recover his damages. And in American courts, maybe punitive damages as well." 
What logicians already know is that restrictions to various fine-structure formats of assertion, and accompanying 'lightweight calculi' can improve performance in consistency checking and proof search dramatically. It might be of interest to see whether these correspond to anything in legal reasoning.
Winning strategies may be too costly to execute, so we must sometimes settle for less. This can be modelled by assigning costs to actions in a game tree, and then computing optimal strategies through the tree given initial resources of players.
There have been suggestions for 'science courts', where legal-style debate would be used to get best current opinions on issues that have been under scientific debate for a very long time -and where some temporary resolution would be useful, e.g.
when preparing funding decisions.
